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Overcoming the Divide between Freedom and 
Nature: Clarisse Coignet on the Metaphysics of 
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From 1865-1870, Clarisse Coignet was an integral member of a collective of French 
intellectuals who defended a version of Kantian ethics founded on the dignity of the free 
individual. This movement’s mouthpiece was La Morale indépendante, a weekly magazine. 
Coignet wrote the largest share of articles and produced the most sophisticated 
philosophical defence of the movement’s core ideas. She developed this defence into a 
monograph, sharing the same name as the magazine, published in 1869.  
In the 1860s, Coignet defended the view that a true independent morality requires 
that the human subject stand outside of the realm of mechanistic nature. However, in her 
later 1911 work De Kant à Bergson, published when she was in her late eighties, she argues 
that this dualism can be overcome by means of the new understanding of nature 
introduced by evolutionary science and the metaphysics of the new spiritualists, such as 
Émile Boutroux and Henri Bergson. In this article, I examine (i) the reasons why Coignet 
ABSTRACT: Clarisse Coignet (1823-1918) played an important role in a 
number of the most important intellectual movements in nineteenth-century 
France. She grew up around and documented the leaders of the Fourierist 
movement, provided the philosophical support for the La Morale indépendante 
(an influential movement that promoted the rebuilding of French society on 
the basis of free morality, rather than religion), and spent twenty years 
defending the secularization of education and improving French primary 
schools. She developed her own theoretical and practical philosophy and 
applied it in the social world to play her part in the transformation of her 
country “from more or less an absolute monarchy, into a free republic” 
(Coignet, 1903: 7). Despite all of this, her work has received very little 
philosophical attention. This article focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of 
her practical philosophy, and the importance of her engagement with the 
French spiritualist tradition for its development.  
 
attempted to bring together her form of Kantian ethics with spiritualist metaphysics, and 
(ii) the philosophical gains of this reconciliation.1  
I argue, first, that to understand the motivation for Coignet’s about-face regarding 
the relationship between humans and nature, we should look to her life story. Coignet 
grew up in close contact with many of the most important utopian socialist followers of 
Charles Fourier. She attributes her first religious conversion to Fourier’s ideas on the 
harmony of all beings. Nonetheless, as a young adult she converted to non-conformist 
Protestantism and found its emphasis on human freedom incompatible with such a 
harmony. Coignet was critical of the early forms of spiritualism that emerged from Victor 
Cousin’s school, and of metaphysics more generally. She claimed that her philosophy came 
from the perspective of criticism, a phenomenist method inspired by Kant and Charles 
Renouvier, the latter being one of the harshest critics of Cousin’s school. Nonetheless, I 
shall show in this paper, even at this period Coignet stood midway between the spiritualists 
and the critical school. Like the former, but not the latter, she believed that we have a 
direct intuition of our free activity. But she objected to the further metaphysics of the 
spiritualists because she believed that it, like Fourierism, led to a determinist pantheism 
that swallowed up human freedom.  
 The new spiritualists, however, inspired by developments in the life sciences, 
developed a theory of nature as open, creative, and evolving. In this theory, I argue, 
Coignet found the framework necessary to bring together nature and the free human 
subject, and, consequently, unite the utopian socialist ideals of Fourierism with the focus 
on individuality in the Protestant religion. But what are the philosophical gains of such a 
reconciliation? First, it undercuts the dualism of nature and the noumenal self in Kantian 
ethics, and allows a one-world foundation for her practical philosophy that is compatible 
with a non-compatibilist theory of freedom. Second, it drew out some of the potential 
ethical implications of Bergson’s work at a time when Bergson himself claimed not to have 
anything to say about such matters.2  
 The article proceeds as follows. In §1, I present a short biography of Coignet to 
contextualise her work and intellectual development. In §2, I focus on her critique of 
Cousin’s old spiritualism. In §3, I present an exposition of her positive philosophy of 
                                                 
1 The only philosophical presentation of Coignet’s philosophical works in English is a summary of her 
ethical work La Morale indépendante. This is part of a collection of overviews on women in the history of 
philosophy. See Allen, 1991. 
2 In a 1914 New York Times article, Louis Levine reports Bergson claiming that a book authored by him on 
ethics would be “news from nowhere”.  
independent morality. In §4, I argue that Bergson’s new spiritualism provided Coignet with 
the solution to reconcile the sharp division between nature and mind that she had posited 
in her works on independent morality. In §5, I argue that Bergsonian metaphysics further 
presented her with a way to reconcile her protestant religious beliefs with her earlier 
Fourierist romanticism. Crucially, this new reconciliation allowed her to reap the rewards 
of a non-dualist metaphysics without having to accept the determinism of traditional 






Coignet was born in 1823 in La forge de Montagney, France. From a young age, Charles 
Fourier’s utopian socialism played a significant role in Coignet’s life and intellectual 
development.3 Her aunt Clarisse Vigoureux (1789-1865), under the influence of Coignet 
family friend Juste Muiron (1787-1881), was the first female disciple of Fourier (CCM 
I.221). Her living room was a centre for the study of his work and it was there that the 
Fourierist movement proper was born. Victor Considérant (1808-1893), then aged just 
sixteen, joined them, and later became the movement’s most significant leader.  
 Fourier’s utopian socialism was founded on an extremely broad intellectual system. 
In addition to interconnected theories of education, ideal society, and the progress of 
history, he defended a speculative cosmogony (see part one of his Theory of Four Movements.). 
Of all the ideas that undoubtedly had a lasting effect on Coignet’s thought (including his 
socialism, optimism for humanity, respect for work, and his views equality) his cosmogony 
had the most transformative effect (see OC I.94, and Beecher, 1986: 118). The Catholicism 
she had been brought up on left her cold, but Fourier’s romantic theory of the “joyful 
unity of all living creatures” (CCM I.240-241) provided her first live connection to religious 
feeling: “How much more dignified such a conception of an infinitely powerful, just, and 
good creator seems to me,” she writes, “than did the sad sin and incomprehensible 
damnation, which, after making an entire race responsible for the fault of one person alone, 
makes us bow down, since the beginning of the world, in humiliation, pain and penance!” 
(CCM I.241) 
 Fourier claimed that there is a law of the harmony of all beings and that his task 
was to be the Newton of the social world. By discovering this law, he could discover the 
                                                 
3 On Fourier’s utopian socialism, see Beecher (1986). On the Fourierist movement, see Alexandrian (1979), 
Beecher (2001) Coignet (1895), and Louvancour, (1913).  
social mechanisms that would allow perfect goodness and harmony to be realized. One of 
the key problems of contemporary ‘civilization’, as he saw it, is that restrictive social 
conventions have led humans to repress their instincts and this obstructs the divine course 
of nature, causing immense suffering. In sharp contrast to views that regard the moral life 
as necessarily involving self-sacrifice, Fourier believes that in true social harmony we would 
be one with nature. This would involve a return to the natural passions and such a universal 
fulfilment would lead to the growth of goodness in each individual, and to a greater 
attraction and love between all human beings.   
From age sixteen onwards, Coignet would dedicate much time to reading works 
of romantic literature and keeping up with politics and Fourierist writings. She believed 
that, “socialism in the economy of societies corresponds to romanticism in literature. Both 
proclaim the perfect goodness of nature coming out of God’s hands, its right to free 
development, to complete satisfaction” (CCM II.42). At twenty-one, Coignet moved to 
Paris and arrived in the centre of the Fourierist world at its most vibrant time. However, 
it was in the thick of this activity that she started to have doubts about the clarity of 
Fourier’s vision. These doubts would be exacerbated a few years later when she moved to 
Liverpool, England. There she encountered non-conformist Protestantism, which 
provided her with a very different framework for her religious feelings.  
Her encounter with Protestantism laid the ground for her eventual defence of a 
form of Kantian ethics. As Coignet saw it, although the sixteenth-century Reformation 
“innovated nothing new in theology”, its true novelty was to substitute “the inner and 
personal experience of belief” for the authority of the church (1911: 67). It was “a protest 
of individual conscience against the authoritarian government of the Church… a return to 
the spirit of the Gospel, to freedom, to inner piety” (CCM II 98). She felt that this focus 
on the conscience of the individual was a radically different way of thinking to those that 
she had experienced with either Catholicism or Fourierism:  
  
How far away I feel here from the two doctrines in which my adolescence was 
cradled! In Catholicism, man remains dependant on the Church, in Fourierism, on 
society; here [in Protestantism], on the contrary, he is their foundation. 
Consciousness becomes the source of authority, the cornerstone of the individual 
and, by means of the individual, the group. Duty, henceforth inseparably linked to 
right, returns freedom to self-government and self-sacrifice. At the same time, it 
creates the spirit of initiative and the feeling of solidarity that covers the country 
with philanthropic institutions, and it establishes the government of opinion, 
which becomes a control for the State. (CCM II 110) 
 
Coignet accepts that the first reformers held on to absolute and immutable dogmas and 
failed to recognise the true consequences of their doctrine. Nonetheless, the crucial fact is 
that the reformation was a major historical moment that initiated the release of the 
“individual and living consciousness” from the dogmatic chains of Catholicism, and was 
thus the originating moment of moral freedom (1911: 70).  
Coignet’s Fourierist intellectual background meant that she had been deeply 
engaged with a variety of philosophical ideas and theories from a young age. However, she 
began a systematic study of the history of philosophy thanks to her encounter in the 
autumn of 1858 with Alexandre Massol (1805-1875). Starting from 1860, soon after the 
birth of Coignet’s fourth child, Massol dedicated a great deal of time to teaching her the 
history of philosophy. Massol was an inspiring teacher. In 1904, she reflected on these 
years of study as “among the best in my life” (CCM III.251). Massol went through 
philosophy’s history with her chronologically. She found much of interest in Aristotle and 
Spinoza who both left a lasting impact on her work. However, the new critical method for 
philosophy outlined in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason caused a “complete revolution” in her 
mind:     
 
Critique… by wrenching the illusions of transcendence from man, far from 
weakening him, strengthens and enlightens him. No longer dependent on 
mysterious and incomprehensible principles, he can freely study his surrounding 
environment and himself, and two distinct worlds appear to him.  
Outside, physical phenomena appear connected in a regular and constant 
order of causes and effects… 
Inside, another perspective appears to him. He feels and conceives himself 
as free, responsible, and obligated. Although he holds on, by instinct, to the natural 
order, he overcomes it through the perception of a good and evil foreign to instinct 
and that carry their sanction in themselves in the joy or pain that follows from their 
accomplishment. It is the moral life invincibly enclosed in natural life, right 
enshrined in force, freedom in necessity, voluntary duty in servile submission, so 
indeed the irresponsible elements form the matter for responsibility. Thus, the 
morality that liberates human personality from universal mechanism endows it 
with a grandeur and dignity that becomes the principle of right. (CCM III.238-239) 
 
In 1865, Massol invited Coignet to join a school of like-minded thinkers who could be 
united under the name La Morale indépendante. The centre of this movement would be a 
weekly journal directed at the public dedicated to ethics, religion, politics, and philosophy. 
Coignet was central to La Morale indépendante. As Behrent has noted, she produced the most 
sophisticated defence of its central philosophy and the greatest share of substantive articles 
(2006: 425-426). The aim of this journal, as Massol put it, was to highlight the fact of the 
freedom of the individual, and that the rights and duties of humanity are founded on this 
freedom (IM I.1-3). While many philosophers have emphasised this fact, the job of the 
journal was to remove the theory from its purely speculative state and to turn it into “a 
careful and precise idea” (IM I.2). The 1789 revolution had overthrown the old order but 
failed to build something satisfactory in its place. The independent moralists aimed to show 
that the new order must be built on the foundation of the free individual who derives their 




The journal caused controversy from its inception.4 Cousin was prominent among the 
choir of those who denounced it; and he could still lay claim to being the dominant voice 
in French spiritualist philosophy (despite his popularity being in clear decline). Alfred 
Fouillée reports Cousin telling him that the theory of independent morality was a 
“philosophical no less than a religious heresy” and that “it must be crushed” (1887: 57 and 
57n1). The first time Coignet would directly attack Cousin’s brand of spiritualism, 
however, would not be until a few months after his death, in a series of articles in La Morale 
indépendante dating from 26th May 1867 to 21st July (IM II.339-340, 354-356, 372-374, 402-
404).  
Coignet starts by claiming that Cousin was less a philosopher than an actor 
performing as a philosopher (IM II.339). Although he played this role with outstanding 
eloquence and flair, such artistic tricks impress only for so long. Consequently, she claims, 
Cousin “experienced the particular pain” of seeing “the youth he had managed to gather 
at the feet of the pulpit, docile and thrilled by his every his word, suddenly move away 
                                                 
4 Mothers were warned “to guard their children against morale indépendante” (Stock-Morton, 1988: 71; cf. 
72n51).  
from it indifferent and deaf, mocking, and aware that they had been previously deceived” 
(IM II.339).  
 Coignet’s philosophical criticism of Cousin is based on his defence of “Impersonal 
Reason” (IM II 354-356) and its incompatibility with freedom. Cousin maintained that 
spontaneous intuition could put us into immediate contact with universal and necessary 
truths. These truths are just as obvious to the woefully ignorant as they are to a Leibniz 
(1862: 52-53). He claims that in such an experience of a universal truth, our consciousness 
is merely witness to the truth and does not in any way play an active role in its formation. 
Since these truths are universal, necessary, and presented to us without our own personal 
intervention, Cousin concludes that these “absolute and necessary” truths must have a 
foundation that is absolute and necessary; “this being”, he argues, “which is at the 
foundation of truth as its very essence, in a word, is called God”. (1862: 72).  
As Coignet and many others have noted5, Cousin’s theory of God as the absolute 
foundation of Reason, also takes on pantheistic tones. This impersonal reason is not just the 
foundation for truth but also the foundation of the world and all it contains. The troubling 
consequences of this for the individual and morality in the development of history, Coignet 
argues, are identified in his Introduction à l’histoire de la philosophie. He tells us there that history 
is “the ultimate expression of divine action” and that it is “because Providence is in 
humanity and in history, that humanity and history have their necessary laws” (1861: 158). 
Since these laws are the expression of God’s will, we must see the results of wars as God’s 
judgments on humanity (1861: 190–4). In war,  
 
we must maintain our greatest sympathy for the winner, for every victory brings 
about progress following it… [T]he winner’s party… is always the party of 
civilization, the loser’s party, the party of the past. The great defeated man is a great 
man displaced in his time. We must therefore applaud his defeat; it was just and 
useful. (1861: 222)  
 
From this view of God’s will, Coignet argues, it follows for Cousin’s moral theory that 
individuals are not ends in themselves, but mere means its satisfaction. Consequently, 
                                                 
5 See Moreau (2014) and Vermeren (1995). Interestingly, the very young Cousin may have been much 
closer to Coignet than his published writings suggest. In 1817, Jouffroy wrote that Cousin would not 
publish his latest course because it “shows too clearly a truth that one cannot yet say, namely that morality 
is independent of religion” (cited in Ragghianti and Vermeren, 2019).  
human beings can have neither real rights nor autonomy. As we shall see in more detail 
below, to have autonomy, in Coignet’s view, is to act on ends that are our own and not the 
dictates of another, and our rights depend on being recognised as an individual that can 
act upon such ends.6  
 Coignet is not entirely critical of Cousin. She writes that he “sometimes has strange 
flashes of insights concerning moral life” (IM II 403). In particular, she praises his insight 
that we do not recognize our freedom through logical reflection, but through inner 
experience. In fact, this alignment with Cousin shows that Coignet’s philosophical position 
was not entirely in line with Kant’s critical view. Coignet’s critical philosophy, even in the 
1860s, rests somewhere between the French neo-critical Kantians, on the one side, like 
Charles Renouvier, who was a semi-regular contributor to La morale indépendante and who 
Coignet herself cites as a major influence (CCM III.320), and the spiritualist philosophers, 
such as Cousin and Maine de Biran, on the other.7 Renouvier rejected the claim that we 
have any such experience of freedom of ourselves as an active cause of our actions. When 
we think we are experiencing ourselves initiating an action, we are really experiencing 
simply the muscular sensation corresponding to the action having been effected. Crucially, 
Renouvier thought that critical philosophy must not go beyond the phenomena of 
experience, which any postulation of active forces would do (1912: 261). Similarly, for 
Kant, we cannot know the inner self except through a priori forms of intuition. Coignet, 
contrary to both, sees a much stricter distinction between the reflection on inner sense and 
the experience of the external senses. When it comes to the phenomena of external senses, 
Coignet stresses her allegiance to Kantian criticism, but at the same time she insists that 
we have a direct intuition of our human freedom. It is a “primitive fact of human nature” 
(1869: 123). It is revealed to us insofar as we recognise that we have a direct experience of 
ourselves as the active cause of our actions. Such an experience is particularly clear when 
we feel the “clash of inner feelings”. This clash occurs when passion directs us to act one 
way, but our understanding of our obligations directs us to act another, yet we choose to 
act according to duty and thus overcome our passions by means of the activity of our will 
(1869: 108). 
 Although Cousin believes that we have a direct intuition of our freedom, Coignet 
argues that his simultaneous affirmation of an all-powerful God responsible for all of 
human history stands in a straightforwardly contradictory relationship with it. This is 
                                                 
6 Coignet’s Kantianism is in line with the kind of interpretation of Kant we find in Korsgaard’s work. See 
Korsgaard (1996: 128-131). For a critique of this reading of Kant, see Allison (2011: 209-218).  
7 On Maine de Biran and the experience of activity, see Dunham (2016).  
where, she argues, Cousin’s “lack of rigour” as a philosopher is most evident. Cousin’s 
freedom is freedom to act in accordance with the pre-ordained external laws of morality 
defined by God without obstruction. However, for Coignet, this form of freedom is no 
freedom at all. If freedom is to mean anything for human beings, then it cannot be derived 
from obligations that God has given us, but rather must be the foundation of these very 
obligations themselves. She writes that “obligation without primitive freedom would only 
be the servile obedience of a being without rights. Only freedom makes it noble” (1869: 
15). By this she means that mere obedience to God’s moral laws would make us mere 
means to exterior ends and not an end in itself. The problem with Cousin’s theory is that 
although he emphasizes the importance of the experience of freedom, he immediately turns 
his back on that experience to make room for the determinism that follows from his 
rationalist arguments in defence of an all-powerful pantheistic God. His philosophy 





Cousin’s moral theory represents, for Coignet, the worst combination of traditional 
religious with metaphysical morality. She rejects both for the same reasons. They suggest 
that there is an idea of justice existing in a distinct sphere (whether this is God’s mind or 
a Platonic third realm) that is the foundation for ethics and that we can somehow 
encounter by means of thought or intuition. However, she argues that the critical method 
(defended by Kant and the independent moralists) shows that we cannot adequately 
explain our epistemic connection to such truths. The revelations of revealed theology turn 
out to be the results of our individual feelings and the absolute ideas of natural theology 
and metaphysics are subjective forms of our understanding (1869: 26). This shows the 
main point of divergence between Coignet’s critical morality from most forms of 
nineteenth-century French old spiritualism. Even if the spiritualists rejected revealed 
theology, most (whether loyal to Cousin or not) tended to emphasise close links between 
their morality and natural theology.8 However, even if it were the case that we could 
acquire knowledge of morality in the ways defined by the religious or metaphysical 
moralist, such a morality would still be in conflict with true freedom.  
                                                 
8 Jules Simon publicly abandoned in his earlier views on the connection between theology and ethics and 
argued for an independent morality of sorts in 1869. See Le Devoir, 1869: 20-21 
 The critical method, Coignet insists, is the “method of doubt and research” that 
“must destroy everything to renew everything” (1869: 189). Once this method has shown 
the problems with moral systems that attempt to draw their laws from outside of the 
human, only the human is left. Consequently, it is on the freedom of the individual that 
morality must be built. When Coignet unpacks her understanding of freedom, the Kantian 
tones sound clearly. The freedom she defends is not the freedom to simply follow one’s 
own instincts and pleasures (à la Fourier and the naturalists), nor merely the freedom to 
follow God’s will. In both these cases the agent would be merely a means to an end that is 
distinct from them. Coignet, on the contrary, defends the freedom of self-legislation: “it is 
the freedom that rules itself by virtue of a law that it alone administers and that it alone 
fulfils” (1869: 6). In Coignet’s view, the free agent is free because they are cause and effect 
of themselves: 
 
Human morality is not free because it enters into the divine framework of eternal 
wisdom, because it can unite to God by submitting to the church. One is not free 
because they can eat when they are hungry and drink when they are thirsty…  They 
are free because, while enclosed in a system of forces and laws that we call nature, 
they see an end not given to them by nature, they posit this end themselves and 
realise it. (1869: 57-58)  
 
For an individual to count as free they must be able to produce a determinate 
representation of how to act in accordance with a law of which they themselves are the 
legislator—this is the end not given by nature—and this representation must be able to 
have a causal effect on how they will act. The act of self-willing is a causal power (see 
Engstrom, 2009: 134). This view is obviously influenced by Kant, but while Kant limits 
himself to saying this freedom is a necessary presupposition for this form of willing, 
Coignet insists that we feel the causal power enact itself, and this feeling is itself the proof 
of freedom.  
It is this causal power that elevates the human above nature. Natural beings such 
as plants and animals progress according to a plan of which they are not the authors. The 
human being “begins a new order: the order of individual freedom and responsibilities” 
(1869: 58). Insofar as they recognise themselves as the author of the end of which they 
strive, which is itself the cause of their actions, rather than being merely caused to act by 
other external entities of beings, they recognise that they are not merely a means to an end, 
but an end in themselves. This recognition is the source of the order of responsibilities as 
well as freedom, because to recognise oneself as a free being is to recognise oneself as 
possessing “a unique dignity and grandeur” (1869: 58). Since we possess such qualities, we 
are worthy of respect, and, therefore, have the right to be respected. Freedom, Coignet 
claims, “by constituting the dignity of the individual implies the respect for this dignity” 
(1869: 86). However, the recognition of right is simultaneous with the recognition of duty. 
If one is worthy of respect then one is obliged to respect oneself and to respect others who 
are similarly worthy of the same respect. Respect and obligation go together as a package 
deal.  
Coignet’s socialist tendencies are apparent right from the very start of what looks 
to be her version of Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative. Since duties 
and rights are the product of, and not prior to, human freedom, it means that there is a 
strict equality of rights amongst all beings, irrespective of race, class, gender, or even 
metaphysical status. There is not a hierarchy where we have duties to a God without 
obligations towards us. If we had duties without rights, we would be in the position of the 
slave towards a master. Once we recognise the inseparability of right and duty, we see that 
all human beings–as free rational beings capable of acting in accordance with their own 
ends–possess dignity and the right to be respected. This, therefore, is a universal formula, 
but one that we realise from inner reflection, and whose validity we derive from this 
reflection alone. Furthermore, it is a formula that extends morality from the individual to 
society. The job of society, Coignet suggests, is to recognise this law as its foundation, and 
to attempt to guarantee the possibility that it be followed. 
If this socialist interpretation of Kantian morality evidences the continued 
influence of Fourier, this influence only extends so far. Central to Fourier’s romantic vision 
was the importance of following the instincts and passions of nature. Coignet, on the 
contrary, argues that such a blind following of the passions would lead the individual away 
from equality towards excessive dedication to individuals at the expense of others. 
“Maternal love” can become a “blind and excessive passion” that “will lead the mother to 
sacrifice to the interest of one the interest of all”. The love of a man can lead “a woman 
to forget her own dignity… to the point of making herself the toy of his whims” (1869: 
95). Devotion remains a moral virtue only insofar as the ideal of justice seen by the free 
individual tempers it. Nonetheless, morality is not antagonistic to nature, but rather should 
be considered as its regulator:  
 
It [morality] consecrates the feeling of conservation and all the natural freedoms 
related to it as the necessary condition for the development of the individual, but, 
at the same time, it determines its place, it limits its absorbing expansion and selfish 
invasions. It elevates all feelings by assigning them a nobler end. Married love, 
maternal love, friendship, kindness, sociability, ambition, patriotism, when 
enlightened and transformed by morality, become to varying degrees the agents of 
justice. (IM III 125) 
 
The aim of society is to produce the conditions necessary for ideal justice. There are both 
inequalities of nature (physical strength, beauty, skills, etc...) and circumstance (family, 
social position, wealth) which allow individuals very different opportunities. These are 
harms for individuals that a just human should feel obliged to improve. Coignet often 
emphasises that she regards “the practice of the good” as a “voluntary activity” (1869: 65). 
This is why. Mere respect is a passive morality, but active morality depends on not just 
recognising the right, but “in constituting it” and “making it prevail” (1869: 99). The 
obligation that we should feel once we recognise our right and those of others should 
motivate us to “level the scales” when faced with the opportunity:  
 
The more inferior in strength and resources the one that we have been called to 
help is, the more imperative the command is; and the more we are able to penetrate 
the extent of their misery, the more obligated we feel ourselves to be. (1869: 101-
102) 
 
Insofar as we recognise the rights of others and actively attempt to balance the unequal 
forces of nature, the more we recognise ourselves as constituting a moral series that is 
distinct from it. Yet, although this series is distinct, it is necessarily connected. Morality is 
active, and this activity is the struggle against nature’s impulses and inequalities. The moral 
series, thus, interacts with the natural one. It is the attempt to reform our nature so that 
our dispositions and habits are shaped to follow the good. Although, the struggle to even 
the scales is a source of virtue, it does not follow that such virtuous activity must always 
seem like a struggle. The influence of Aristotle on Coignet means that she sees a much 
more positive role for habit in her moral theory than Kant did. At least on the surface, 
Kant appears as one of philosophy’s harshest critics of ethical habits. For him “all habits 
are objectionable”. (AK 7: 149). Ethical actions are supposed to be those that follow from 
the self-produced representation of the law (AK 4: 42), but if habitual actions are those 
that occur without conscious reflection, then they occur without such a representation. 
Coignet disagrees. We must form our habits through well considered choices following 
our duty established via the moral law, but rather than prohibit the passions, she claims 
that by this procedure they are elevated towards wisdom (1869: 132). Our freedom can 
transform our nature such that second nature is rational nature. Nature itself can become 





La Morale indépendante came to an abrupt end in 1870 due to the Franco-Prussian war. 
According to Coignet, this state of national emergency left no room in people’s minds for 
the kinds of speculative studies that formed the core of the journal’s considerations. It is 
perhaps for this reason that the majority of Coignet’s writings from this period until her 
1911 De Kant à Bergson appear to deal with more practical or applied topics, education in 
particular. But even though these writings deal with topics outside of theoretical 
philosophy as contemporarily understood, the influence and application of her Kantian 
inspired independent morality is consistent. Kant’s critical turn is key to her series of books 
on education (see 1874 and 1881) and plays a central role in her 1903 work on the future 
of the French republic, Où allons-nous?, as well as in her 1908 work on the evolution of 
French Protestantism.  
 The main shift in De Kant à Bergson is that Coignet highlights the incompleteness 
of the work begun by the independent moralists. The problem as she sees it in 1911 is that 
it left too much of a stark contrast between the free moral individual, on the one hand, 
and the necessity of mechanical nature, on the other. The problem is evident in Coignet’s 
stress on morality’s role as a “regulator” of nature. If the divide between nature and mind 
is too wide, it is hard to see how we can account for the interactive role to which she 
attests. “A Transcendental wind”, after all, “cannot drive a real sailing boat” (Dunham, 
Grant, and Watson, 2011: 133). 
Coignet’s concern with the early French spiritualists of Cousin’s school was that 
while they professed to make room for freedom, they eliminated its true ground by making 
the progression of all thing (human actions included) flow from the necessity of the 
Absolute, or God. She objected to the swallowing up of human freedom, whether it be by 
mechanical or divine nature. However, in the wake of Cousin’s death and as the 
implications of the theory of evolution started to make themselves felt, the new generation 
of spiritualists offered a new dynamic metaphysics that was much more congenial to 
Coignet’s tastes.  
Boutroux’s 1874 doctoral thesis, published as De la contingence des lois de la nature, 
took the theory of evolution (albeit a decidedly Lamarckian version) and argued that it 
could be extended beyond the biological domain. Not only do species evolve, so too the 
more fundamental structures of nature–even nature’s laws. At the most fundamental level 
in nature, there are basic inner powers spontaneously striving (insofar as they are able) 
toward self-improvement. All beings can gradually improve through their interactions with 
each other, and higher beings improve generationally through heredity. It is by means of 
the strivings of such agents that eventually, but contingently, the stable structures in nature 
that we come to believe to be necessary laws are formed. Laws of nature are not 
ontologically separate from agents or anything over and above them at all, but rather 
habitual patterns realised by the individual agents themselves. 
The structures of nature that the faculty of understanding had taken to be 
necessary, immutable, and essential turn out to be a mere symbolic framework that the 
mind uses to make sense of these regularities formed from an original spontaneity. The 
key to apprehending this original spontaneity, according to Boutroux, is to recognise that 
the understanding is not the only faculty by means of which we can grasp the world. 
Coignet writes in agreement that:  
 
we must appeal not only to the faculty of reason but also to the faculty of feeling 
and intuitive knowing, and thus by grasping the immediate reality of inner 
knowledge, of consciousness in the psychological sense of the word, we attain a 
knowledge that is very different from logic but rather modelled on the real. (1911: 
37) 
 
As we have seen already, Coignet, in contrast with other neo-Kantians, was sympathetic 
to the claim that it is through our inner experience that we obtain direct apprehension of 
our volition. However, what is crucial about De Kant à Bergson, is that she adopts the further 
spiritualist doctrine that such experience brings us into contact with the metaphysical 
nature or reality more broadly. For Coignet, Bergson’s work is an important extension of 
Boutroux’s because he establishes the distinction between the two methods of 
understanding nature, i.e., the method of external observation and the relation of facts 
through reason, on the one hand, and intuition, i.e., the direct apprehension of inner 
knowledge, on the other, with the utmost rigour. Crucially, while setting out this distinction 
he is also careful not to undermine the essential role of either. Science uses the method of 
external observation and this method is necessary:  
 
The old enmity of science and metaphysics was due to mutual encroachments. 
Metaphysics claimed to impose its decrees on science, while science, on behalf of 
its own, claimed to eliminate those of metaphysics. Bergson reconciles them by 
showing that, while representing two distinct and special forms of knowledge, they 
contribute by their union to its development. (Coignet, 1911: 151-152)  
 
The object of science is to measure and predict; however, such measurement and 
prediction is only possible in the determinate conditions of space, and by considering 
things in terms of quantity. As is well known, Bergson believes that science’s error has 
been to consider the inner phenomenon of the mind as examinable in the same manner. 
The psychologist has attempted to consider the mind in terms of distinct abstract parts 
that can be separated or combined, analysed and classified. According to such a conception 
it may seem as if the mind is fully determined by its precedents, certain combinations of 
ideas lead to others necessarily, and all of this is correlated with neural mechanisms. 
However, such a deterministic conclusion is the product of a faulty method of analysis. 
The correct method for analysing human experience is in fact intuition (see Bergson, 1903: 
40). But what is intuition?  
Intuition can sound rather mystical and thus off-putting to contemporary ears. The 
basic idea, however, can be explained without recourse to anything esoteric. Bergson asks 
us to reconsider how we think about experience and to question the classical empiricist 
conception of analysing experience.) Empiricists like Hume and Locke understand 
experience as a noun (See Phemister, 2004: 207). We have an experience. Furthermore, an 
experience is the thing that provides us with ideas, but it is the ideas themselves that are 
important. An experience is a composite or bundle of ideas. Such a way of thinking of 
ideas is a perfect example of thinking of the mind in terms of “space”, since it is conceived 
using “quantitative” examples. Ideas are put together like building blocks. Bergson’s 
argument for intuition is that this is the wrong way to understand experience. Instead of 
analysing experience as a noun, we should analyse it as a verb in the active voice. We should 
understand it not as presented to as if it were a static entity, but rather as lived through. In 
Bergson’s own language we should move our attention away from the “already-made”, and 
instead focus on the “being-made” (1911: 238; 259). The ‘being made’ is not a series of 
entitative units, one replacing the other, but rather a continual flux, which we play an active 
role in bringing about. In this continual flux, we do not experience one discrete moment 
replaced by another (although this is how we must understand it when we reflect upon it), 
but rather a pure continuity where every moment extends into every other.   
Consider watching an arm rise through geometrical space. Although when I watch 
your arm rise up, I represent it as moving through defined spatial positions, and I could cut 
up each of these positions into distinct moments (that could easily be replaced by another), 
the same is not true of my experience of moving my own arm up in the air. As I lift my 
arm, I do not experience distinct replaceable moments, but a continuous process where 
the past (the intention) continues to live on throughout the process until my arm reaches 
the desired position. As lived through, we understand it as one single continuous process 
with concrete duration, even though as presented to (from the outside) the lifting of an arm 
looks as if it is merely a succession of replaceable moments.  
 Just like Boutroux, Bergson sees the teachings of inner sense, or intuition, as the 
basis for understanding not just human experience but also the ultimate nature of being. 
The creative impulsive movement of experience that we discover in intuition, he argues, is 
of the same nature as life itself. Coignet writes:  
 
In its concrete representation, life appears to us as a vast sheaf from which emerges 
an impulsive power whose progress is comparable to a shell bursting into shattered 
fragments, the fragments of which also shatter, and so on without stopping. (1911: 
118)  
 
All the forms of life are the product of the unstable equilibrium expressed in this metaphor 
of the shell. On the one hand, the continuing force of life, on the other, the resistances of 
the matter. This “unstable equilibrium” gives rise not just to the evolution of species, but 
also to the evolution of the world and all of its ultimate forms. The “fundamental point”, 
according to Coignet, of Bergson’s philosophy is that this “force of life” is itself a “mental” 
force. Matter is passive and resistant, mind is creative and active, and therefore the ultimate 
force of nature belongs to this second category. This is why intuition is required to 
understand evolution, to understand nature as creative. “We do not think evolution”, 
Coignet writes, altering Bergson’s own prose slightly, 9  “we live it” (1911: 144). 
Nonetheless, Coignet insists that Bergson’s philosophy is not anti-intellectualist (if this 
term is supposed to refer to someone who rejects all knowledge gained from science or 
the intellect). We need the intellect to separate ourselves from the pure immediacy of 
duration, but reality exceeds the intellectual. Therefore, attempts to understand the world 
and its future in full by means of either apparatus alone will fail. The creative future 
contains new elements that cannot be grasped by a static intellectual structure formed 
entirely from past actions, but immediacy without concepts and the intellect’s tools is not 
communicable at all.   
The dual relationship between intuition and intellect allows Coignet a framework 
to think the relationship between the free activity of the moral agent, on the one hand, and 
nature, on the other, without having to understand the two as standing apart from each 
other as if in two separate realms without an epistemically intelligible connection. Both the 
free agent and evolving nature have the same source. Nonetheless, at the same time, we 
do not lose the predictive power of science and its undeniable ability to make sense of the 
world and form new technologies. The distinction, which Coignet credits to critical 
philosophy, between the way that we experience the outside and the inside world remains 
in place, but with the proviso that all is united at the metaphysical level. The metaphysical 
nature supposedly revealed by intuition is the foundation for rectifying the division 
between nature and mind that had been formed by Kant’s critical philosophy. The mind’s 
moral life is no longer a series that stands over and above passive mechanical nature, but 
one that is what it is through its interactions with and formation through spiritual nature. 
“Bergsonian spiritualism is new”, Coignet wrote because 
 
while affirming the reality of mind, far from excluding nature, it assimilates it. By 
returning life to the psychic order, and by attributing to it, through its adaptation 
to matter, the universal and inexhaustible creation of thing, it envelops nature in 
its spirituality. (1911: 152) 
 
Even during the La Morale indépendante period, Coignet’s moral philosophy already entailed 
a greater role for the interaction between mind and body than is necessary in Kant’s. This 
is because she argued that our self-willed moral actions should ultimately tame, regulate, 
and rewire our passions and bodily instincts. This struggle over nature is one of the aims 
                                                 
9 Bergson writes that we do not think “real time” (1911: 53).  
of moral philosophy, according to her, and it is her main divergence from Fourier’s 
romanticism. Bergson’s emphasis on the primacy of “spirit” in the generation of mind and 
matter provides a clearly metaphysical picture to allow for the necessary interaction, since 
it no longer posits a straightforward difference in kind between the two. Kant’s antinomy 
between the efficient causation of space and freedom of human nature is overcome in 
favour of an original spontaneity that gives rise to a twofold evolution into habits of nature 





In this final section, I show that Bergson’s philosophy was important for Coignet, not just 
because of its reconciliation of mind and nature, but also because she argues that it offers 
to key for the reconciliation of mind and nature with the divine. Bergson’s philosophy, I 
argue, makes good on the promise she had originally seen in Fourier’s cosmogony of the 
universal harmony of all beings.  
Coignet was not alone in seeing Bergson’s philosophy as key in the reconciliation 
of science, faith, and morality. Many of Bergson’s most important disciples were Catholics 
who found in his work the same promise (e.g. Jacques Chevalier, Édouard Le Roy, and 
Charles Péguy).10 However, what makes Coignet’s particular blend unique and important 
is the fact that her earlier critiques of the appeal to instinct, in Fourier, and pantheism, in 
Cousin, meant that she was particularly sensitive to these risks emerging in any 
reconciliation involving Bergson’s philosophy. The source of our normative ethics must 
still be based on the autonomy of the individual and not on mysticism. 
 As I showed in the previous section, Bergson’s triumph was to understand both 
intuition and the understanding in their dual relationship. For Coignet, this dual 
relationship is in turn the way we need to understand the evolution of religion. She writes 
that “[a]lthough the source of religion is completely inner, the human being has a need to 
express their adoration externally as they do internally. This expression takes the name 
symbol” (1911: 49). Just as in science, we come to the ‘truth’ of religion through intuition, 
but we require the symbolism of the understanding to express this truth. However, both 
religion and science have been liable to make the same error, i.e. to reify the symbol to the 
                                                 
10 On Bergson’s reception amongst Catholics, see Azouvi (2007: 141-147), Cohen (1986), Hellman, (1981), 
Viellard-Baron (2008)  
status of the absolute truth. Catholicism, according to Coignet, is the main offender. It has 
asserted the infallibility and immutability of its symbolic dogmas. Such an assertion is an 
attempt to halt the progress of life, to fail to see that “ideas evolve, and our minds with 
them” (1911: 64).  
 As we saw in §1, Coignet believes that the reformation was the first important 
revolution in overturning Catholic dogmatism. Although Protestantism held strongly onto 
dogmas of its own, it did at least substitute the authority of the Church for “the inner and 
personal experience of belief” (1911: 68). This inner experience, the intuition of religious 
belief, is, for Coignet, the key to the reconciliation of religious believers regardless of their 
system of belief. Although it is futile to try to solve the sectarian struggles and reconcile 
the different systems of belief with their contradictory symbolic structures, the inner 
source of religious faith may unite all believers. The different structures that have been 
formed are merely various ultimately fallible and instable attempts to try to give form to 
and communicate this feeling.  The inner feeling is the universal that takes us beyond these 
varying representations. Our symbols may have a certain practical use, but nevertheless 
this should not prevent us, Coignet writes, from uniting “in this universal and invisible 
Church to which Bergson so eloquently called us” (1911: 81). It is the ultimate truth that 
all religious believers are truly trying to communicate.  
 Coignet credits her first religious conversion to Fourier’s romantic image of the 
“joyful unity of all living creatures” (CCM I.240-241). In §III we saw that her commitment 
to Kant’s “criticism” led her to abandon this view for much of her philosophical career, 
since she regarded the moral series as one existing outside of the natural world. The crucial 
point of Bergson’s philosophy was that it provided her with the intellectual support to 
return to Fourier’s image. Coignet claims that on the principles of Bergson’s philosophy 
we “no longer need to feel ourselves isolated in humanity”, i.e. we no longer need to feel 
ourselves as an atomic individual separated from our fellow human beings, whether they 
be believers in religion or not, we also no longer need to believe that humanity is isolated 
“in the nature that dominates it” (1911: 153). The passage that Coignet takes from Bergson 
to conclude her work (1911: 153) echoes this clearly:  
 
As the smallest grain of dust is entirely bound up with our solar system, drawn 
along with it in this undivided movement of descent that is materiality itself, so all 
organized beings, from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life 
up until our time, and in all places as in all times, only make sensible to our eyes, a 
unique impulsion, opposite to the movement of matter and, in itself, indivisible 
[spirituality]. (1911: 295. The text in brackets is Coignet’s own insertion) 
  
Coignet is quick to point to the potential religious implications of such a view. What is this 
spirituality from which comes all individual beings with their thirst for life? That “God is 
spirit and life” is a belief shared by all religions. What Bergson has done, Coignet argues, 
is explain what this belief means. He has changed it from an empty abstraction (as perhaps 
it was even in Fourier), and shown its “living reality” through intuition.  
 It is unsurprising that Fourier’s image would remain a living influence on the 
development of Coignet’s philosophy. Even when she had turned to Kant, she shared 
family members still devoted to the Fourierian cause, and her husband François Coignet 
was a Fourierian who had written his own Fourierian tract (1848). But a question still hangs 
over how even the Bergsonian vision of the harmony of all beings can at the same time be 
reconciled with a morality that is supposed to be independent? When the Catholic Le Roy 
converts Bergson’s intuition into religious language, he talks of turning to inner reflection 
as “giving oneself to God” so as to become a vessel for God’s goodness. But despite 
postulating a single source as the ultimate nature of mind and matter, Coignet must resist 
pantheism. We have already seen her reject Cousin’s spiritualism on that basis, and only 
three years before De Kant à Bergson she rejects Schleiermacher’s theology for the same 
reason (see 1908: 131). How does Coignet avoid her freedom-based morality getting 
sucked up into what is starting to sound like a pantheistic—no matter how “creative” and 
“vitalistic”—vision?  
 Here is how I think Coignet would answer this question. Independent morality is 
independent because it starts from the autonomy of the individual; the individual is its own 
source for its moral code. Independent morality is independent exactly because it starts 
from the individual’s own attempts to come to its morality without depending on the word 
of the Church or State. For Coignet, in contrast to Kant, as we have seen, we have a direct 
intuition of our consciousness as free and active. This direct intuition, however, she argues, 
through her studies of Boutroux and Bergson, does not merely reveal to us our own 
freedom, but has a more cosmic significance. It reveals to us the type of activity through 
which we can understand nature: not as cold and mechanical, but as living and evolving. 
Furthermore, we recognise that our attempts to capture this living and evolving nature are 
limited by the structure of our intellect, which is much more easily applicable to the 
seemingly immutable and necessary structures of mechanical science. Progress in science 
requires us to recognise that this structure is not immutable and that it hides the initial 
contingency and spontaneity of the world. Coignet’s further move is to insist that a similar 
problem haunts religious belief. We have attempted to capture the living spontaneous 
spiritual nature of God under solid structures and unquestionable texts, but failed to 
recognise that such an attempt halts the progress of religion just as it does science. 
Ultimately, Coignet claims that science, religion, and morality are united in the same 
spontaneous active nature–God–symbolically expressed in different ways. So far, so 
problematic. However, crucially, the starting point that leads us to this belief in an ultimate 
unity is the free active individual, and, she insists, this is an individual that does not get 
swallowed up in the process.  
 It is important to note that Coignet’s analysis of freedom remains very different 
from Bergson’s. Bergson emphasises that it is the “whole soul… which gives rise to the 
free decision: and the act will be so much the freer the more the dynamic series with which 
it is connected tends to be the fundamental self” (1910: 167). For the Catholic Bergsonians, 
this meant that free acts are those that turn away from the rational representations of our 
actions to the intuition of our duration (see Cohen, 489). Contrary to Coignet, this 
becomes a mystical intuition that connects us to God. Bergson’s God, who is “unceasing 
life, action, freedom” (1911: 262). At times, it sounds as if free action is really giving oneself 
up to the creativity of God or, at least, the “vital impulse”.11  
Coignet’s God is the source of all but, she argues, does not determine the outcome 
and we should not “give ourselves to him” so that he could. Evolution is unpredictable, 
contingent, and it lacks the predetermined finality of either Leibnizian teleology of 
mechanical determinism. There is no divine plan and no restriction of the causation of the 
world to efficient causation. The individual may be harmonious with all beings, but they 
freely play their part in this harmony. Human beings do, of course, express a much higher 
degree of freedom than any other living beings on the planet. But some degree of 
spontaneity is shared by all. Nevertheless, spontaneity may be a necessary condition for 
free action, but it is in no way a sufficient one. On the essential conditions for freedom, 
Coignet is much closer to the classical German tradition than Bergson. For her, free action 
is self-conscious rational action.12It is the following of rules that we choose rationally. This 
                                                 
11 See Bergson (1935: 130). I think Dewey gets it right, in his discussion of Bergson, when he writes, “A 
spiritual life which is nothing but a blind urge separated from thought…is likely to have the attributes of 
the Devil in spite of its being ennobled with the name of God.” (1922: 53). For a recent defence of 
Bergson’s ethics, see Ansell-Pearson (2018).  
12 As Rödl has rightly claimed, the heart of German idealism is the claim that “self-consciousness, freedom 
and reason are one” (2007: 105). 
form of autonomy brings with it distinctive value, and thus obligations, and rights. In this 
way Coignet’s final metaphysic balances the intellect and intuition in a way that gives more 
weight to the rational intellect. Coignet’s turn to Bergson, therefore, allows her to revive a 
version of the Fourierian romantic image, but still from the starting point of independent 
morality, or what she regarded as the true starting point of the Protestant faith. Perhaps it 
is no wonder then that despite the enthusiasm of many Catholic youth, and of the Catholic 
leanings of Bergson himself (see Sinclair, forthcoming), Pope Pius X placed Bergson’s works 







Coignet’s attempts to grapple philosophical problems stemmed from a real personal desire 
to reconcile in her mind the varied strands of thought that were emerging in nineteenth-
century France. These included non-conformist Protestantism, sophisticated 
understandings of classical German philosophy, socialist and republican political thought, 
as well the general flourishing of homegrown French philosophy that followed the 
downfall and death of Cousin. I have argued that in Bergson’s philosophy she found the 
key to reconcile the Fourierst romanticism of her youth with an independent morality 
founded on individual autonomy. However, she was no mere disciple of Bergson. The 
fusion she developed provided a practical philosophy much more focused on the freedom 
of the rational human than anything that could be found in the works of either Bergson 
or his followers. Here she tips the balance between the intellectual and the intuitive in 
favour of the former and avoids the ethical mysticism of Bergsonism. For the Bergsonian 
faithful, this may rather seem like a negative than a positive, but for those who look for a 
clearer normative ethics than mysticism could ever provide, it should seem like a very good 
reason to pay Coignet’s work serious attention.  
 
Acknowledgements: I’d like to thank Delphine Antoine-Mahut, Mark Sinclair, Joe Saunders, 
Emily Herring, and Emily Thomas for comments and help with earlier drafts of this article. 









AK: Kant, I. Kants Gesammelte Schriften. 29 vols. Königlich Preussiche Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (ed.). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902. Cited by volume and then page 
number, 1902.  
 
CCM:  Coignet, Clarisse. Mémoires. 4 volumes. Lausanne: Pache-varidel. Cited by volume 
and then page number, 1899-1904.  
 
IM:  Multiple Authors. La Morale Indépendante. 5 years. Cited by author, year number, 
and then page number, 1865-1899. 
 
OC:  Fourier, Charles. Oeuvres completes. 12 volumes. Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1966-
1968.   
 
Other texts cited  
 
Alexandrian. Le Socialisme romantique. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979.  
 
Allen, Jeffner. ‘Clarisse Coignet.’ In Mary Ellen Waithe, ed. A History of Women 
Philosophers. 1600-1900. Dordrecht: Springer, 1991, 171-185 
 
Allison, H. Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011 
 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith. Thinking Beyond the Human Condition. London: Bloomsbury, 2018 
 
Azouvi, F. La gloire de Bergson. Paris: Gallimard, 2007.  
 
Beecher, Jonathan. Charles Fourier. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.  
---. Victor Considerant. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 
 
Behrent, Michael. Society Incarnate: Association, Society, and Religion in French Political Thought, 
1825-1912. Ph.D Thesis, NYU, 2006.  
 
Bergson, H. Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by T.E. Hulme. Cambridge: Hackett, 
1912.  
---. Creative Evolution. Translated by A. Mitchell. New York: Harper & Row, 1911. 
---. Time and Free Will. Translated by F. L. Pogson. London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1910.  
---. Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Translated by Ashley Audra and Cloudesley 
Brereton. New York: Henry Holt, 1935.  
 
Boutroux, Émile. De la contingence des lois de la nature. Troisième édition. Paris: Felix Alcan, 
1898 
 
Cohen, Paul Michael. “Reason and Faith: The Bergsonian Catholic Youth of Pre-War 
France”. Historical Reflections. 13(2/3), 1986.  
 
Coignet, Clarisse. La morale indépendante: Dans son principe et dans son objet. Paris: Germer 
Baillière, 1869 
–––. Cours de morale à l'usage des écoles laïques. Le Chevalier: Paris, 1874 
–––. De l'education dans la démocratie. Delagrave: Paris: 1881  
–––. Victor Considérant, sa vie, son oeuvre. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1895. 
–––. Où allons-nous ? Paris : H. Paulin & Cie  
–––. L’Evolution du Protestantisme Français au XIXe siècle. Paris : Félix Alcan, 1908  
 
Coignet, François. Projet d'association libre et volontaire entre les patrons et oeuvriers et de réforme 
commerciale présenté aux comités du travail et de l’agriculture de l’Assemblée nationale au nom du 
Comité du Travail de Lyon. Paris: Imprimerie Lance Levy et Cie., 1848. 
 
Cousin, Victor. Cousin, Victor. Introduction à l’histoire de la philosophie. Paris: Didier et Cie, 
1861. 
–––. Du vrai, du beau et du bien. Neuvième édition. Paris: Didier, 1862 
 
Dewey, John. Human Nature and Social Conduct. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1922 
 
Dunham, Jeremy. “Idealism, Pragmatism, and the Will to Believe”. British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy. 23(4): 756-778, 2015.  
 
Fourier, Charles. The Theory of Four Movements. Edited by Gareth Jones and Ian Petterson. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 
 
Hellman, John. “Jacques Chevalier, Bergsonism, and Modern French Catholic 
Intellectuals”. Biography. 4(2): 138-153 
 
Korsgaard, C. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Louvancour, Henri. De Henri de Saint Simon à Charles Fourier. Chartres Imprimerie 
Durand. 1913 
 
Moreau, Pierre-François (2014) ““In Naturalismo”: Leibniz, Spinoza et les spiritualistes 
Français”. In: R. Andrault, M. Laerke, and P. F. Moreau, Spinoza/Leibniz. Rencontres, 
controverses, receptions. Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris-Sorbonne 2014, pp. 225-244.  
 
Phemister, Pauline. ““All the time and everywhere everything’s the same as here”: The 
Principle of Uniformity in the Correspondence Between Leibniz and Lady Masham”. In 
Lodge, Paul, ed. Leibniz and His Correspondents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994, pp. 193-213 
 
Ragghianti, Renzo, and Vermeren, Patrice. Victor Cousin: Philosophie morale. Classiques 
Garnier, 2019 
 
Renouvier, Charles. Traité de psychologie rationnelle. Tome premier. Paris: Armand Colin, 1912   
 
Simon, Jules. Le devoir. Neuvième édition. Paris: Hachette, 1869. 
 
Sinclair, Mark. Bergson. London: Routledge, forthcoming.  
 
Stock-Morton, Phyllis. The Development of Morale Laïque in Nineteenth-Century France. New 
York: SUNY Press, 1988 
 
Viellard-Baron, Jean-Louis. “Réflexion sur la réception théorique de L'évolution 
créatrice”. Archives de philosophie. 2(71), 2008.  
